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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
C O R A L E E G R E E N H A L G H , 
individually and as Guardian 
Ad Litem for the minor 
P A T R I C K G R E E N H A L G H and 
W I L L I A M T. G R E E N H A L G H , 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
vs. 
DOCTOR R O B E R T H O G A N and 
P A Y S O N CITY H O S P I T A L 
through its Board of Directors and 
P A Y S O N CITY as the sole owner 
and proprietor of P A Y S O N CI T Y 
H O S P I T A L , Oe/mdanis-Eespowdenfe. 
Case No. 
13695 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
S T A T E M E N T OF T H E CASE 
This is an appeal from the Order entered by the 
Court in the Fourth Judicial District in and for Utah 
County, the Honorable Allen B. Sorensen presiding, 
from the motions of the defendants to dismiss. 
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D I S P O S I T I O N I N L O W E R COURT 
Defendant Doctor Robert Hogan moved the lower 
court to dismiss the claims of plaintiffs William T. and 
Coralee Greenhalgh on the basis that said claims were 
barred by § 78-12-28 (3) Utah Code Ann., (1953) ; the 
motion was granted and their claims dismissed with 
prejudice. 
Defendants Payson City and Payson City Hos-
pital moved the lower court to dismiss the claims of all 
the plaintiffs on the basis that (1) Payson City and 
Payson City Hospital are covered by the Governmental 
Immunity Act, § 63-30-1 et. seq. and that no notice was 
given Payson City either under § 10-7-77 Utah Code 
Ann., (1953) or 63-30-13 Utah Code Ann., (1953) and 
(2) the claims of plaintiffs are barred by § 78-12-28 (3) 
Utah Code Ann., (1953). The motion was granted and 
plaintiffs' claims dismissed with prejudice. 
R E L I E F S O U G H T ON A P P E A L 
Appellants seek a reversal of the Order dismissing 
the suits and a referral to the District Court for further 
proceedings consistent with said reversal. 
S T A T E M E N T O F T H E FACTS 
Coralee Greenhalgh, individually and as Guardian 
Ad Litem for her son Patrick Greenhalgh and William 
T. Greenhalgh, the boy's father, brought this suit 
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against the defendants for damage which resulted from 
the alleged negligence of Defendant Hogan and Pay-
son City Hospital. The alleged negligent acts occurred 
in the middle of January, 1970. 
Defendant Doctor Robert Hogan moved the lower 
court to dismiss the claims of plaintiffs William T. and 
Coralee Greenhalgh on the basis that said claims were 
barred by § 78-12-28 (3) Utah Code Ann., (1953) the 
motion was granted and the claims dismissed with 
prejudice. 
Defendants Payson City and Payson City Hos-
pital moved the lower court to dismiss the claims of all 
the plaintiffs on the basis that (1) Payson City and 
Payson City Hospital are covered by the Governmental 
Immunity Act, § 63-30-1 et seq. and that no notice was 
given Payson City either under § 63-30-13 Utah Code 
Ann., (1953) or under § 10-7-77 Utah Code Ann., 
(1953) and (2) the claims of plaintiffs are barred by 
§ 78-12-28 (3) Utah Code Ann., (1953), the motion was 
granted. 
A R G U M E N T 
P O I N T I 
T H E O P E R A T I O N O F PAYSON C I T Y 
H O S P I T A L I S A P R O P R I E T A R Y F U N C -
T I O N O F T H E C I T Y G O V E R N M E N T A N D 
T H U S P A Y S O N CITY I S NOT E N T I T L E D 
TO A S S E R T G O V E R N M E N T A L I M M U N I T Y 
AS A S H I E L D OR D E F E N S E TO T H E P R E S -
E N T SUIT. 
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The defendants Payson City Hospital, through its 
Board of Directors, and Payson City have taken the 
position that plaintiffs' complaint is barred by the op-
eration of the Governmental Immunity Act because the 
plaintiffs failed to give proper notice. This defense 
raises two issues; (A) Whether the asserted defense of 
governmental immunity is a viable shield or defense to 
this suit and (B) assuming governmental immunity is 
not a defense, are the plaintiffs barred by their failure 
to comply in the notice requirements of § 10-7-77 Utah 
Code Ann. (1953). These issues will be discussed sepa-
rately herein as Points I and I I . 
I t is well established in Utah that where a public 
body, which would otherwise be entitled to sovereign 
immunity, engages in an activity of a commercial or 
proprietary character, the protection of governmental 
immunity does not exist, Nestman v. South Davis 
County Water Improvement District, 16 Utah 2d 198, 
398 P . 2d 203 (1965) ; Wade v. Salt Lake City, 10 Utah 
2d 374, 353 P . 2d 914 (1960); Davis v. Provo City 
Corp., 1 Utah 2d 244, 265 P . 2d 415 (1953). 
In the complaint filed in this action, the plaintiffs 
have alleged in paragraph three that Payson City Hos-
pital was managed and operated at all times referred to 
therein for a profit. Under the Utah Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure, Rule 12, a motion to dismiss assumes that all of 
plaintiff's allegations are true. Assuming therefore 
that Payson City Hospital is operated for a profit, we 
turn to the issue. 
4 
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Although this Court has not faced this exact issue 
before, it has decided several cases which lend guidance 
in the area. In Nestman, supra., the Court brought itself 
to grips with the problem presented in the present case. 
In that case, a water improvement district had been 
created with power by the district to levy taxes and to 
act in other areas to initiate and create a water system 
charging a fee for water services provided, and after 
the water system had been created, the water district 
became an autonomous body liable for negligence in 
connection with the operation of said business. The stat-
utory provisions allowing for the creation of a water im-
provement district are similar in nature to the statutory 
authority found in § 10-8-90 through 93, Utah Code 
Ann., (1953) allowing for the ownership of hospitals 
by cities. 
Another case which is strikingly similar to the one 
at hand is Griff en v. Salt Lake City, 111 Utah 94, 176 
P . 2d 156 (1947). The ultimate holding in that case was 
that Salt Lake City's operation of a swimming pool was 
a proprietary function rather than governmental. The 
reasoning that led to that decision is pertinent here. The 
city's first argument was that since statutes provided for 
city ownership of pools, such ownership was necessarily 
a governmental function. The court disposed of this ar-
gument by noting that: 
". . . municipalities were not only granted the 
right to establish and maintain bathhouses and 
swimming pools, but also the power to supervise 
the same, which contemplated that some of them 
might well be in private ownership." at 159. 
5 
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I t shall be noted that Utah law through the Hos-
pital Licensing Act, § 26-15-54, Utah Code Ann., 
(1953), et. seq. also contenmplates private ownership of 
hospitals. Judicial notice may be taken of the numerous 
privately owned hospitals throughout the State. 
The Court in Griff en went on to state that : 
"we see no occasion for extending governmental 
immunity from liability for tortious acts of em-
ployees, by labeling some activity as a govern-
mental function simply because the enterprise is 
municipally owned. We are particularly adverse 
to reading something into the statute which 
would have the effect of permitting municipali-
ties to engage in various enterprises only in a 
governmental capacity, when such activities are 
of the type and character of businesses owned 
and managed by private citizens for pecuniary 
profit." at 159. 
In Griff en, supra., another fact important to the 
court in reaching its decision finds its parallel in this 
case, that being that the city charged parties admission 
fees. Payson City Hospital, being operated for a profit 
also charges its patients fees for services. The court held 
that: 
" . . . under the facts of this case, a showing that 
there was an admission charge, a collection of 
State and Federal taxes on admission . . . and 
related factors which indicate that the swimming 
pool and facilities are operated as a business en-
terprise, the operation of the institution in ques-
tion is not a governmental function, and hence 
Salt Lake City has no immunity from liability 
for negligent operation." at 160. 
6 
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Plaintiffs would cite to the Court two cases from 
other jurisdictions which have passed on this issue. 
Beard v. City and County of San Francisco, 180 P . 2d 
744 (1947), a district court of appeal case, cited with 
approval in Muskoph v. Coming Hospital District, 359 
P . 2d 457 (1961). Beard, supra., involved a plaintiff 
who sued for damages on a complaint alleging that he 
had placed his fifteen month old son in the city and 
county hospital for hospitalization and medical care as a 
paying patient, and that said hospital was operated by 
the city and county of San Francisco in its proprietary 
capacity. The court discussing the issue of whether the 
hospital was operated by the city in its proprietary or 
governmental capacity said: 
"When a chartered city accepts its grant of 
power and establishes a hospital for health and 
public welfare of the community, it has two 
courses to follow—it may maintain a hospital for 
the indigent alone, or it may maintain one in 
competition with private hospitals in the same 
community, charging fees for both medical care 
and hospitalization. If the latter course is fol-
lowed, patients need not be restricted to the in-
digent members of the community but they could 
be accepted without regard to legal residence and 
would be charged fees in competition with the 
private hospitals. If this course is followed, a city 
would be operating the hospital in a proprietary 
capacity as to paying patients just as it operates 
its street-railways, water, gas, and electric facili-
ties, and other utilities for the benefit of the com-
munity at large." at 746 (emphasis added). 
7 
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In Sears v. the City of Cincinnati, 31 Ohio St. 2d 
157, 285 N.E. 2d 732 (1972), the court held: 
". . . that a municipal corporation which owns a 
municipal hospital is, under the doctrine of re-
spondent superior, liable for the torts of its ser-
vants and may not interpose the defense of gov-
ernmental immunity against an injured patient 
in an action for damages." at 735. 
This holding was drawn from the courts conclusion: 
". . . that where a municipality owns a hospital, 
thereby providing a service not essential to muni-
cipal government, there is no basis in logic for 
granting the municipality governmental immu-
nity as to that hospital." at 735. 
The Supreme Court of Nevada in McKay v. 
Washoe General Hospital, 33 P . 2d 755 (1934), and 
Bloom v. Southern Nevada Memorial Hospital, 275 P . 
2d 885 (1954) has held that under Nevada law the hos-
pitals in question were not legal entities and thus not 
ameanable to suit. However, in Hughey v. Washoe 
County, 306 P . 2d 1115 (1957) the court held that al-
though the hospitals could not be sued, the county which 
was the owner of the hospital could be sued. 
Utah law does not require a city to build and main-
tain a hospital. However, when a city elects to do so and 
elects to operate that hospital for profit, the operation 
of the hospital by the city is clearly a proprietary func-
tion of government and thus the city is liable for the 
torts of its employees committed in the regular course of 
business. 
8 
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P O I N T I I 
I F I T I S F O U N D T H A T T H E PAYSON 
C I T Y WAS O P E R A T I N G PAYSON C IT Y 
H O S P I T A L I N A P R O P R I E T A R Y CAPAC-
ITY, T H E N O T I C E R E Q U I R E D BY § 10-7-77 
A N D § 63-30-13 U T A H CODE ANN., (1953) TO 
B E G I V E N P R I O R TO I N S T I T U T I N G A 
L A W S U I T D O E S NOT A P P L Y . 
In the lower court it was the position of the de-
fendant Payson City that even assuming that the op-
eration of Payson City Hospital was in the nature of a 
proprietary function, the present suit was barred be-
cause it involves a claim against a city and no notice 
had been given said city as required by § 10-7-77, § 10-
7-78, Utah Code Ann., (1953). 
I t is plaintiffs' position that the notice requirement 
does not apply if the claim is the result of a city's action 
in its proprietary capacity. 
Under Utah law governmental entities are immune 
from suits for any injury which is a result of actions 
of those entities in their governmental functions. How-
ever, the legislature has seen fit to waive immunity in 
certain areas involving the governmental entities, § 63-
30-1 Utah Code Ann. (1953) et. seq., conditional how-
ever on the governmental entities receiving notice. 
Section 10-7-77 of the Utah Code Ann., (1953) 
provides for a time period in which to give notice of a 
claim against a city. Implicit in that section is that the 
9 
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notice requirement applies only to those areas in which 
immunity has been waived. The legislature has the 
power to prescribe by statute conditions upon which 
suits may be brought and maintained against a muni-
cipality relative to its governmental function, where it 
would otherwise be immuned from suit. However, 
where a municipality is involved in a proprietary func-
tion, no such immunity ever existed and thus no notice 
is required. The legislature could have specifically pro-
vided that such notice requirement also extend to pro-
prietary actions but it did not do so. 
An example of such specific legislative intention is 
evidenced in the Iowa statute requiring a 90 day filing 
of suit or 60 day notice on claims of damages against 
municipalities. 
"Every person who claims damages from any 
municipality for or on account of any wrongful 
death, loss, or injury within this scope of Section 
613A.2 shall commence an action therefore with-
in three months, unless said person shall cause to 
be presented to the governing body of the mu-
nicipality within sixty days . . . written notice 
. . . I.C.A. 613A.5." 
I.C.A. 613A.2 referred to in the statute above pro-
vides : 
". . . every municipality is subject to liability for 
its torts and those of its officers, employees . . . 
whether arising out of a governmental or propri-
etary function." 
Under the Iowa statutory scheme, there is no doubt 
that the filing of a suit or a notice within a certain time 
10 
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period is required. The Utah statute § 10-7-77 is re-
ferred to in the Governmental Immunity Act and is 
couched in language relative to the exceptions provided 
for by the Governmental Immunity Act. Therefore, 
it would seem that § 10-7-77 should be read to apply 
only to those areas where immunity has been waived 
and not to those areas where immunity never existed. 
In Dahl v. Salt Lake City, 147 P . 622 (1915) the 
court was faced with a claim against the defendant 
city where no notice had been given. The Court, under 
the same statute, which is now § 10-7-77 Utah Code 
Ann., (1953), held that notice had to be given within 
the statutory time period for damages arising out of 
alleged tortious conduct by the city while performing a 
governmental function. The Court in that case was not 
required to reach the issue of whether or not notice 
would be required in the case where a city was acting 
in a proprietary capacity at the time of the tortious 
conduct. 
In reviewing the cases in Utah which have dealt 
with § 10-7-77 Utah Code Ann., (1953) I find no 
cases which have resolved the issues of notice where the 
governmental entity is engaged in a proprietary func-
tion. This Court in the Nestman v. South Davis County 
Water Improvement District case used strong language 
in indicating that they did not wish to expand the doc-
trine of governmental immunity. I t would seem that 
to require notice under § 10-7-77 Utah Code Ann., 
(1953) or under the provisions of the Governmental 
Immunity Act, 63-30-1 Utah Code Ann., (1953) et 
11 
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seq. to proprietary functions would in fact expand 
considerably the doctrine of governmental immunity. 
I t should be further taken into consideration that 
long before the enactment of the Governmental Im-
munity Act, 63-30-1 Utah Code Ann., (1953) et. seq., 
governmental entities have been held liable for tortious 
conduct committed while engaged in proprietary func-
tions. If the legislature had intended that the notice 
requirements of the Governmental Immunity Act and 
§
 10-7-77 Utah Code Ann., (1953) should apply to gov-
ernmental entities while engaged in proprietary func-
tions this could have easily been spelled out by way of 
legislation. In examining § 63-30-13 Utah Code Ann., 
(1953) the legislature specifically spelled out an ap-
plication of § 10-7-77 when filing a claim under section 
63-30-8 Utah Code Ann., (1953). 
Other jurisdictions have been confronted with the 
problem of notice requirement when a governmental 
entity is involved in a proprietary function. The 
Nebraska Supreme Court in Henry v. City of Lin-
coln, 140 N.W. 664 (1913) the court held that the 
statute which required a 30 day notice of a claim against 
a city was not intended to apply to a case arising out 
of the conduct by a municipality of purely private (in 
this case a water district) business enterprise volun-
tarily entered into which is outside its ordinary gov-
ernmental function or corporate duties. 
If this Court determines that the notice require-
ment of § 10-7-77 does apply to proprietary functions, 
12 
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it is plaintiffs' position that the one year period has not 
yet begun to run. Section 10-7-77 provides in part: 
". . . Every claim . . . against any city or town 
must be presented, properly itemized or de-
scribed and verified as to correctness by the 
claimant or his agent, to the governing body 
within one year after the last item of such ac-
count or claim accrued . . . " (emphasis added) 
In plaintiffs' complaint it is alleged that the dam-
ages and expenses arising from the negligence of de-
fendants are continuing to accrue. Since this allegation 
must be taken to be true under a motion to dismiss, it 
is clear that the "last item of such claims" has not yet 
accrued and thus the one year notice period has not yet 
begun to run. 
P O I N T I I I 
I T IS P L A I N T I F F S ' P O S I T I O N T H A T 
SINCE A T T H E T I M E C O R A L E E A N D W I L -
L I A M T. G R E E N H A L G H ' S CAUSE O F 
ACTION ACCRUED, A F O U R Y E A R STAT-
U T E O F L I M I T A T I O N S W A S I N E F F E C T , 
SAID F O U R Y E A R S T A T U T E GOVERNS 
P L A I N T I F F S ' CLAIMS. 
Defendants based their motion to dismiss in part 
on the basis that plaintiffs' claims were barred by 
§ 78-12-28 Utah Code Ann., (1953) which provides 
for a two year limitation on malpractice suits. The 
effective dates of § 78-12-28 Utah Code Ann., was 
July 1, 1971. Prior to that date § 78-12-25 provided 
13 
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for a four year period of limitations. In the lower 
court, defendant Hogan in his memorandum cited Day 
$ Night Heating Co. v. Ruff, 19 Utah 2d 412, P . 2d 
43 (1967) and O'Donoghue v. Washington, 66 Wash. 
2d 787, 405 P . 2d 258 (1965) in support of his posi-
tion that a two year limitation applied. 
I t is plaintiffs' belief that there is a distinction 
between the above cases and the case before the court. 
Ruff, supra., involved a statutory right given a ma-
terialman against an owner. O'Donoghue, supra., in-
volved a claim against the State which had waived 
immunity but had provided that a suit had to be com-
menced within 120 days. Earle v. Froedteil Grain and 
Malting Company, 197 Wash. 341, 85 P . 2d 264 which 
was quoted with approval in Ruff, supra., involved a 
statutory right to recover a preference but provided 
that a suit to recover the same must be filed within six 
months. All of these cases involved a statute which 
shortened the time allowed to sue. 
The distinction between the cases relied on by the 
defendants and the present case is that in Earle, Ruff, 
and O'Donoghue, supra., the limitations went to the 
cause of action or right to sue whereas in the present 
case the limitation, like most such statutes, goes to the 
remedy of the defendant. See Earle, supra. 
In 53 C.J.S. § 4 the rule regarding statutes of lim-
itations it set forth: 
". . . statutes of limitation will not be given a 
retroactive effect unless it clearly appears that 
the legislature so intended. . . . However, within 
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the constitutional limits, a statute of limitations 
may have effect on causes of action which have 
already accrued as well as any causes of action 
which accrued after its passage. Whether or not 
it does so will depend on the language of the act, 
and the apparent intent of the legislature to be 
gathered therefrom . . . " (emphasis added) 
In enacting § 78-12-28 the legislature has clearly 
manifested its intent that the new period apply pros-
pectively only by including in 78-12-47 the words "this 
act shall not be construed to be retroactive." I t is a 
fundamental rule of law that, 
". . . to effect must be given, if possibly to every 
word, clause, and sentence of a statute. A statute 
should be construed so that effect is given to all 
of its provisions, so that no part will be inopera-
tive or superfluous . . ." Suthreland Statutory 
Construction, (Sands Ed.) 46.06 
I t is elementary that the legislature could not pass 
a statute of limitation which would cut off a cause of 
action which had accrued more than two years but less 
than four years prior to the new statute. Such an action 
would be unconstitutional. Vol. 53 C.J.S. § 4 C. There-
fore, in order to avoid being superfluous, the words in 
74-12-47, Utah Code Ann., (1953) "This act shall 
not be construed to be retroactive" must be taken to 
mean that the legislature intended the new period of 
limitations to apply only prospectively, that is to causes 
of acting accruing after the statutes enactment. 
An analogous case is Cook v. Massey, 38 Idaho 
264, 220 P . 1088 (1923) which involved a statute which 
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shortened the time for filing an appeal, said statute 
having taken effect prior to any appeal being filed. 
The appeal was filed on a date which would have been 
timely under the old statute but not under the new one. 
The Court held that in the absence of any indication 
of the legislative intent, it was just as reasonable to 
assume that the legislature did not intend the new 
statute to have a retrospective effect as it was to con-
clude otherwise and held that the time within what an 
appeal could be taken was governed by the statute in 
force at the entry of the judgment. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons discussed above, plaintiffs-appel-
lants respectfully submit that the trial court committed 
error in the granting of defendants' motion to dismiss 
and the dismissing of plaintiffs' claims with prejudice. 
They respectfully urge this Court to reverse the Order 
of the lower court and to remand this matter back to 
the lower court for further proceedings. 
Respectfully submitted, 
F R A N K N. K A R R A S 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
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